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**Resisting Reflexive Control: A Reassessment of China's Strategy and A2/AD**

by

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## **Abstract**

The current fixation on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) blinds US military planners to the sophistication of China's approach to strategy and falls prey to reflexive control manipulation. Reflexive control is an indirect means to maintain control over opponents by influencing their decision-making process. The influence comes from conveying specific information and/or actions to drive a predetermined decision. China's strategy is a multidimensional approach that adeptly blends non-kinetic forms of warfare with a modernized military that has brought tensions in the Pacific to heights not seen since World War II. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) increasing assertiveness affects several key aspects of US strategic level planning by diverting attention away from China's greatest vulnerability—the Indian Ocean. Described by former President Hu Jintao in 2004 as the “Malacca problem,” the Indian Ocean controls the flow of an estimated 80 percent of China's imported oil. The significance of this vulnerability is that the imported energy requirement for the People's Republic of China (PRC) is expected to double in the next two decades. Evidence to support this vulnerability thesis also abounds in the PRC's quiet but extensive relationship building and infrastructure investments in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Burma. These investments all have a single intent—reduce the susceptibility of energy interdiction in the Indian Ocean.

The PRC's development of potent A2/AD systems is only part of a much more elaborate strategy that exploits America's instinctive predisposition to solve technological problems with more technology. The United States, however, has neither the fiscal nor military capacity to solve the problem sets inherent in the Pacific's future operational environment. As a result, the United States should examine an alternative strategy that avoids the PRC's A2/AD strengths and concentrates on its weaknesses. Developing an alternative strategy requires the United States to fully understand the complexity of the PRC's approach and to resist reflexive instincts. This analysis recommends that the United States investigate using an A2/AD scheme of maneuver in the Pacific and combine this action with deterrence options in the Indian Ocean. The PRC's greatest vulnerabilities are its inability to project decisive power and protect its Indian Ocean sea lines of communication. China has less than 100 amphibious ships to project power, and any

serious attrition of those vessels significantly impairs the PRC's ability to achieve its objectives. This schema combined with leveraging deterrence options that place the PRC's Indian Ocean transit routes at risk provide a viable means to counter aggressive PRC behavior in the Pacific. If the United States ignores the Indian Ocean, then the PRC will eventually have alternate supply routes through Pakistan and Burma and the ability to employ A2/AD to protect those routes.



## Introduction

*The best strategic empathys seek out the less obvious, underlying constraints on their enemy's behavior as well as their own.<sup>1</sup>*

–Zachary Shore  
*A Sense of the Enemy*

The obsessive focus on Air-Sea Battle and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) immobilizes the very foundations of US strategic thought. As America pivots to the Pacific to counter China's emergent power, China's weapon of choice is not advanced military technology. The communist state's principal weapon is a multi-dimensional philosophy that orients on acting as early as possible, acting as far away from the ultimate objective as possible, and achieving the result with the least effort. From a philosophical perspective, China's overarching intent is first and foremost to defeat an opponent before taking military action. The threat the United States sees in an A2/AD strategy is, in reality, a reflexive control approach by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Reflexive control is an indirect means to maintain control over opponents by influencing their decision-making process. The influence comes from conveying specific information and/or actions to drive a predetermined decision. Mao Zedong spoke about using an indirect approach to gain an advantage, and he once described a parable about how to get a cat to eat pepper, which cats naturally dislike, to help explain what he meant by an indirect approach.

Mao, his deputy Liu Shaoqi, and Premier Zhou Enlai were having an argument on how best to administer pepper to a cat. Zhou suggested that they wrap the pepper in meat so that the cat would eat it unknowingly, but Mao vetoed this as deceitful. Liu then proposed stuffing the pepper down the cat's throat with chopsticks. No, said Mao reproachfully, that would be violent. The two lieutenants turned to Mao: How would you do it? Simple, he said, we'll rub pepper [thoroughly into the cat's fur. When it burns, the cat will] lick it off and swallow it, and be happy that he is permitted to do so.<sup>2</sup>

Planners must recognize the less obvious and indirect methods like the one Mao proposed. Using reflexive control theory, decision makers look at a complex problem and

determine how to shape the environment to make an opponent act in a way that it normally would not. A strategic thinker would get the cat to eat the pepper and like it. China's A2/AD network is the pepper that the United States is "happily" focusing in on. The United States must avoid the myopic concentration on the A2/AD network; instead, US strategic empathists will look at China's strategy holistically.

In any contest, each side tries to keep as much hidden from the opponent as possible. If one side, however, can grasp the reasoning and motives of the other side, then one can begin to shape events as they take place, or, better yet, before they take place. The vital point is to understand the opponent's decision making as they understand it. To accomplish this, a planner must consider the opponent's constraints and motivations. After understanding the contextual reality, it will become clear that the other side only has a few valid options on how to respond to any given crisis because the other options are disastrous. This is called strategic empathy, which "is the skill of stepping out of our own heads and into the minds of others."<sup>3</sup> In the context of China's A2/AD "system of systems," the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has a seemingly daunting military capability that will be costly and difficult to overcome. However, the PRC's military capability does not provide US decision makers with a sense of China's drivers and constraints, which is fundamental to understanding how to weaken its methods of warfare. A2/AD is a military construct formulated to counter a global proliferation of advanced technology in the hopes of creating US analysis paralysis and confusion. The PRC's strategy is exceptionally more elaborate than the simplicity of leveraging A2/AD.

A2/AD is more than a defensive architecture aimed at deterring and denying US capability to penetrate China from east to west. The system is part of a larger, long-term,<sup>4</sup> ambitious Chinese strategy comprised of three important concepts: Three Warfares, Unrestricted Warfare, and China's integrated network electronic warfare (INEW).

### **Understanding China's Strategy: A Different Framework**

**Three Warfares:** The "Three Warfares" concept is a highly deceptive, multifaceted war fighting process that is endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and

the Central Military Commission,<sup>5</sup> which was introduced in 2003.<sup>6</sup> This concept is a non-kinetic tool used to further a military objective, and it consists of psychological,<sup>7</sup> media,<sup>8</sup> and legal warfare.<sup>9</sup> The purpose of Three Warfares is to infiltrate ideas into the minds of the opponents' decision makers and population. The model attempts to get adversaries to come to conclusions that are desirable to the Chinese. Ideally, this concept works by strategically communicating through seemingly harmless actions that lure decision makers to alter their behavior. An example of Three Warfares was demonstrated in the incident in 2010 when two boats collided near the Senkaku Islands.

***Psychological:*** Psychological warfare occurs before, during, and after any type of interaction involving reflexive control. A clear demonstration of economic-based psychological warfare occurred in the 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision Incident involving a Japanese boat and a Chinese trawler.<sup>10</sup> The collision was a targeted Chinese response to Japan detaining a trawler captain and his crew in the contested territory, which also happens to contain numerous oil fields (fig. A.1). After the purposeful collision, "China enacted a two-month unofficial ban on exports of rare earths to Japan."<sup>11</sup> Less than three weeks after the ban, Japan succumbed to Chinese pressure and released the trawler's crew.<sup>12</sup> China denied the use of an unofficial ban on trading,<sup>13</sup> but it is clear that the CCP was willing to use psychological warfare to make US allies think twice before challenging Chinese territorial claims. Often times, China will use media reports to leverage the effects of its Three Warfares model.

***Media:*** China began testing media warfare before "officially" sanctioning the concept as a form of warfare. In the 1990's, the CCP invited US delegations to tour China and receive a message on China's coming decline.<sup>14</sup> After this experience, many lectures and books repeated this story line in the United States. For example, one study lists ten factors that would cause the collapse or slowdown of China.<sup>15</sup> A best-selling book was published in 2001 titled *The Coming Collapse of China* which offered similar opinions on China's impending downfall.<sup>16</sup> "Many [US authors, business leaders, and diplomats] expressed the worrisome view that if the United States pressed China too hard to have elections, to free dissidents, to extend the rule of law, and to treat



ethnic minorities fairly, then this pressure would lead to the collapse of the Chinese state—causing chaos throughout Asia.”<sup>17</sup> This exemplifies the Chinese psychological rhetoric that manipulated the American decision makers on those tours. China carefully invited prolific authors and respected journalists to go on these carefully scripted tours in hopes of future messaging to come from the US delegates themselves. After the books and scholarly articles were written with the pro-Chinese themes, the United States encouraged commerce with the PRC, helped China’s spectacular economic growth, and now must deal with China’s continued reflexive control. Now that China has perfected its new forms of warfare, China is becoming more assertive and leverages legal warfare for its revisionist motivations.

**Legal:** China is quickly developing airstrips and facilities in the Spratly islands under the guise of legal historic claims (fig. A.2.).<sup>18</sup> “China contends that it is only catching up with decades of building by other claimants.”<sup>19</sup> While it is true that other countries such as Taiwan and Vietnam are also building in the area, “China’s building stands out for three reasons: its extent, its speed, and its egregious flouting of the spirit of a declaration signed in 2002 with ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, in which all claimants promised ‘to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes.’”<sup>20</sup> China is using legal jargon to make it appear that it is complying with the law and is forced to develop quickly to keep up with other countries. The CCP leaders are masters at disinformation and using passive aggressive statements to make it look like it is the victim. The “victim” defense is often mentioned in the media to help perpetuate a sense of a continuation of the “Century of Humiliation” (see discussion in the *Instill Nationalism for Regime Survival* section). Top officials are often in the media with legal warfare talking points stressing: 1) other countries encroach on its sovereign claims, and 2) China is the victim in which harm has been imposed.<sup>21</sup>

**Understanding Three Warfares:** The purpose of using non-kinetic forms of warfare is to confuse and influence the way the United States looks at the world. The CCP leaders can also use multiple interpretations of non-kinetic actions depending on the audience. The purpose is to

make the United States question an action, either US or Chinese, and this questioning process changes how the United States thinks and acts. This is the essence of reflexive control.

In order to capitalize on reflexive control, the Chinese pay very close attention to the form of communication and the carefully construed experience of the US policy makers during the interaction. This is clearly demonstrated in the previously mentioned tours that were given to the US delegations in the 1990s.<sup>22</sup> China has carefully studied the US decision-making process, knows how to mix believable information with disinformation, and is acutely aware of how to appropriately institute reflexive control after years of practice.

China has the ability to change actions of other states through non-kinetic means, which has large strategic implications. China has found a way to advance its cause and challenge the intentions of the United States and its allies.<sup>23</sup> The Three Warfares model creates an illusion of indirection for the United States. Chinese moves are ambiguous and attempt to keep the United States from knowing the true intention of China.

China has decided that nuclear warfare and conventional warfare with the United States is too problematic to achieve its political aims. In 2009, then Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo, China's most senior foreign policy official, remarked that China's "number one core interest is to maintain its fundamental system and state security."<sup>24</sup> It is important to note that while state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economic development are top priorities, the need to keep the Communist Party in power is also a core driver in Chinese decision making.<sup>25</sup> China believes it can utilize non-kinetic operations as a cost effective alternative to military operations, while expanding its regional influence. The CCP leaders also think they can meet all of their goals through non-kinetic superiority. China will use a coordinated Three Warfares effort to cleverly support its objectives in the Asian theater while undercutting those of the United States.<sup>26</sup> China is not trying to dominate every move by the United States. Rather, it has redefined the nature of the relationship itself to change the strategic calculus of US decision makers. China's actions fall very much in line with Sun Tzu's concepts of outsmarting an opponent rather than overwhelming an adversary with brute force.

Chinese writings also suggest that striking first is imperative, and these strikes could be nested in kinetic or electronic strikes. US decision makers must be keenly aware that information warfare “greatly emphasizes the concept of ‘gaining mastery of striking first.’”<sup>27</sup>

***Chao Xian Zhan (Warfare Beyond Bounds or Unrestricted Warfare)***: Along with Western theorists, such as Clausewitz and Mahan, military writings in China draw upon Eastern strategic literature such as Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong.<sup>28</sup> In *Unrestricted Warfare*, written by two Chinese PLA Colonels, the main vein of thinking concerns asymmetric attacks against the United States to increase the effects of the Three Warfares model. While *Unrestricted Warfare* can be somewhat shocking in its call for cyber-attacks against the US economy, the biggest takeaway for military planners is how China thinks about attacking the United States without regard to typical laws of armed combat. The United States must be prepared for China to dismiss international norms if the CCP’s survival is at risk. Chinese decision makers understand that the PLA will lose a conventional confrontation with the US military. However, they also understand that they can find US vulnerabilities, attack them asymmetrically, and use the US commitment to follow the rules of warfare as a weakness. In *Unrestricted Warfare*, the authors discuss cyber-attacks against the US civilian population, banking system, and power grids to end a war before it goes kinetic. The PLA advocates the use of non-attributable attacks to keep plausible deniability. With plausible deniability, China will continue its non-kinetic strategy to shape the environment without ever having to face conventional warfare. China believes it can win because it has undergone a “revolution in fighting forms and methods.”<sup>29</sup> China is prepared to combine its Three Warfares maneuvers and its electromagnetic domain weapons as outlined in *Unrestricted Warfare*. While their tenets are not new warfare concepts, the United States must be prepared for enemies who are willing to indiscriminately attack civilian population centers with non-kinetic weapons.

***Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW)***: With the addition of China’s INEW, one can begin to see how Chinese leaders think about the American way of war and gain a clear understanding of China’s revisionist<sup>30</sup> grand strategy to utilize an ever-widening spectrum of

non-kinetic effects. INEW is a Chinese electronic warfare concept that “relies on a simultaneous application of electronic warfare and computer network operations against an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks and other essential information systems.”<sup>31</sup> China understands the US reliance on C4ISR. Establishing information dominance is crucial in PLA doctrine and INEW supports this.<sup>32</sup> China utilizes its civilian hacker community as an asset in its operations.<sup>33</sup> This provides the PRC plausible deniability and a capability to deceive the United States as it leverages non-kinetic weapons. The requirement for information dominance and seizing information flow are “considered so fundamental that *The Science of Military Strategy* considers them a prerequisite for seizing air and naval superiority.”<sup>34</sup>

***Holistic Look at the Framework:*** None of the concepts taken individually would surprise a military planner. However, a holistic look is required to grasp the complex nature of China’s grand strategy—combat the United States using the human and electromagnetic domains. The PRC does not want to confront the United States in conventional warfare. The PLA will avoid conflicts in the air, space, and maritime domains. However, they do wish to deter US power projection with non-kinetic methods of warfare. China’s non-kinetic forms of warfare would not work without a capable military force. The PLA is a force-in-being (see section titled ***Force-in-Being*** for an explanation) whose main purpose in foreign relations is to keep other countries questioning their ability to face a large, modernized force. The CCP plays such a large controlling role in all aspects of the China—PLA, state-run corporations, academic institutions, and government—that China can truly develop and institute a whole-country strategy that is extremely long-term, deliberate, and immune to public criticism. If US decision makers attempt to mirror-image US culture onto China, they will be doomed to fail. The CCP has been using non-kinetic forms of warfare against the United States with success for years. Ultimately, China believes its reflexive control will create a psychological thunderclap that will stop the United States in its tracks.

## **Alternative Explanations for A2/AD**

***Reaction to US Presence in Asia:*** As each side attempts to counterbalance the other, there are some alternative explanations for the A2/AD network besides the obvious defensive capability it provides China. A different way to view the A2/AD network is a reaction to the US presence in the Pacific Theater. The primary assumption is that China is a revisionist state, and the United States wants to keep the status quo. This creates conflict, and China does not want US forces within the Asian theater. In fact, with the US “rebalancing” to the Pacific, China feels like the United States is attempting to encircle it. Resisting encirclement and keeping foreign forces out of Asia is not a new concept for the PRC, and China has developed a unique view of sovereignty.

The root of the Communist leaders’ control comes from Chinese nationalism (see discussion in the ***Instill Nationalism for Regime Survival*** section), which is also where China’s concept of sovereignty comes from. Confucians and Legalists (475-221 BC) advanced the concept of “monism,” which denies that co-equal sovereigns can harmoniously exist in a legitimate international order.<sup>35</sup> “China conceives of sovereignty as divisible: ‘if one had an equal, one was not sovereign.’”<sup>36</sup> The fact that a non-Asian country has so much influence in the region is an insult to Chinese culture. Thus, as long as the US has presence in the Pacific Theater, China does view itself as a sovereign state. At the May 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai, “Chinese President Xi Jinping stated in his opening speech that ‘it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, to solve the problems of Asia, and to uphold the security of Asia.’”<sup>37</sup>

***Gain More Influence to Revise the International Order:*** China’s view of sovereignty is vastly different than the Western notion that arises from Westphalia in 1648.<sup>38</sup> The PRC wants to revise the post-World War II organizations that regulate global affairs such as the United Nations, the World Court, and the World Bank.<sup>39</sup> China realizes that it cannot eliminate these organizations in the near term so it is trying to gain more influence within these organizations as a short-term goal, and it is using its economic success to do this.<sup>40</sup> In the long term, China wants

to upset the current system with a revised global structure that has Chinese characteristics and influence.<sup>41</sup>

***Restrict US Freedom to Roam:*** The current status quo allows the American military the freedom to roam where China does not want it to. The A2/AD is designed to counter US power projection as a larger part of keeping the United States out of the Asian region, particularly the South China Sea. China realizes that the United States uses the maritime commons (and Japan) to advance its strategic position in the Asian-Pacific.<sup>42</sup> The A2/AD structure is attempting to set the terms and limitations for US access as part of its larger grand strategy. “China aims to modify regional expectations and preferences while raising doubts about the legitimacy of the US presence.”<sup>43</sup>

***Restrict US Interference in Economic Affairs in the South China Sea:*** Like America, China prefers diplomatic solutions over military ones. The A2/AD network is a strong deterrent for the United States to interfere militarily in the economic affairs in the South China Sea. The network allows China to take aggressive stances on territorial and maritime disputes with enough military deterrence that the CCP can be relatively assured that disputes will stay at the diplomatic and economic level. Because the CCP is so well-versed and practiced in using reflexive control, this situation is favorable to China. China is attempting to portray itself “as a core country in upholding peace, stability, and security in Asia.”<sup>44</sup> With a successful image campaign as the regional hegemon, the PRC hopes companies and bordering countries will choose to do business with China over anyone else. These basic concepts were discussed by President Xi at the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference in Beijing towards the end of 2013.<sup>45</sup> There, Xi referred to shaping “peripheral diplomacy,” which means strengthening relationships with bordering countries.<sup>46</sup> Xi hopes to “improve regional security, enhance China’s regional influence, and further economic integration of the region to ‘realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’”<sup>47</sup>

## What Really Matters to the CCP

***Instill Nationalism for Regime Survival:*** Nationalism is critical to keeping the population of China supportive of the CCP. The Communist leaders spin media reports, such as those about territorial disputes, as a continuation of the “Century of Humiliation.” Most historians consider China’s “Century of Humiliation” lasting from approximately 1839 to 1945.<sup>48</sup> This time period is when foreign countries extracted significant concessions from the Chinese government.<sup>49</sup> However, the CCP considers the global system as it exists today as a continuation of this humiliation because of “unequal treaties imposed on them by the Western powers and Japan, and based on what they regard as inappropriate legal concepts.”<sup>50</sup> A consequence of this challenge is that China wants to restore itself as the natural hegemon in the region and remove US influence.

The CCP cannot survive without support of the population, which is why the recent 2014 democratic demands and protests in Hong Kong were so out of the ordinary for China. The CCP labeled the protests as “illegal” and censored coverage in mainland China.<sup>51</sup> Communist leaders fear that domestic turmoil will spill over to foreign relations. If outsiders cannot understand how the core interest for the Communist leaders to remain in control of China, then they will never understand the PRC’s actions.<sup>52</sup> While domestic unrest is critically important and is controlled by cultivating a strong sense of nationalism, Taiwan is another main concern for the CCP due to the situation’s ability to discredit the Communist regime.

***Reunite ROC:*** Taiwan, officially called the Republic of China (ROC), is a focal point of China’s strategy. The PRC has stated numerous times that it will not accept an independent Taiwan. In fact, “Chinese government officials have repeatedly warned that if Taiwan ever declares independence, they will respond with military force.”<sup>53</sup> This is a hot button topic for the United States as well. If the ROC were to initiate unification with the PRC after a limited conflict, this would decrease US influence in the region because the United States would be viewed as being unable to uphold its dedication to the security of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.<sup>54</sup>



China uses reflexive control in an attempt to get three things from Taiwan: 1) Taiwan to lose confidence that it can defend itself, 2) capitulate to PRC demands, and 3) lose public support for Taiwan independence. The A2/AD network is the ways and means to support those three ends. China's grand strategy hopes to create the effect of US decision makers questioning a limited war over ROC independence. China has already attacked the ROC with psychological warfare in the hopes that Taiwan would think that the costs of fighting China would be too great and submitting to China's will is the only valid option for Taiwanese decision makers. China does this by attacking ROC's value concepts. For example, the Chinese General Staff Department and General Political Department "reportedly formed a special unit to examine methodologies to spark a 'soldiers movement' to sap gradually the morale of ROC's armed forces and reduce confidence of the Taiwanese people in its military."<sup>55</sup> China also tries to discredit ROC's leadership as demonstrated by the media warfare against the 2008 incumbent President Chen Shui-bian and the 2008 Taiwan election.<sup>56</sup>

***Chinese Propaganda Department<sup>57</sup>—Soft Power Inside the United States:*** Time Square is one of America's most iconic locations (fig. A.3). The large television screens are among the most prominent advertising sites in the United States. Companies such as Coca-Cola and Prudential have advertised there for years.<sup>58</sup> One name that New York tourists may not be familiar with is Xinhua (fig. A.3), China's state-run news agency and propaganda arm of the CCP.<sup>59</sup> Less than five years ago, Xinhua opened an English-language media channel to report 24-hour news "coverage called CNC<sup>60</sup> World, which the group's president, Li Congjun, described as an attempt to 'present an international vision with a Chinese perspective.'"<sup>61</sup> China is using soft power inside of the United States to increase the effectiveness of its reflexive control. Soft power is the idea that a country can have more influence by being more attractive to the population.<sup>62</sup> Some may dismiss this idea and say that America is so big and powerful that soft power does not matter. However, there is another school of thought that thinks that coalition warfare is going to be more important in future operations, and soft power plays a vital role in the extent of a state's cooperation.<sup>63</sup>



China has spent approximately \$8.7 billion in 2011-2012 on its four international news companies, which makes the BBC World Service's \$400 million during that timeframe look like pocket change.<sup>64</sup> Chinese attempts at increasing its soft power globally are all a part of its non-kinetic warfare strategy and must not be ignored. "When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries' domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions."<sup>65</sup> Even worse, if US political leaders feel that it is unpopular to make anti-Chinese decisions, than China will gain the upper hand in US and international affairs. "For Beijing, soft power is a tool to present a less threatening image to the world, to massage anxieties caused by the country's rise."<sup>66</sup> The PRC is attempting to establish an attractive exportable culture for the world, one that is both old and new.<sup>67</sup> As China's soft power changes US perceptions, the PLA downplays its large force modernization efforts.

***Force-in-Being:*** China believes it has built an A2/AD network that the United States cannot defeat. The CCP hopes that the United States will be self-deterred because of this. This deterrence allows China to coerce the United States without ever entering a battle just like Sun Tzu emphasized in the sixth century BC.<sup>68</sup>

It is important to realize that non-kinetic methods of war are only successful if they are backed by a formidable military. China has created a force-in-being with its A2/AD network and the modernization of the PLA. The force-in-being is similar to the fleet-in-being naval concept.<sup>69</sup> Just like the "extent that the Royal Navy employed a fleet-in-being" concept in 1690 and 1782, the PLA wants to use the A2/AD construct as a "delaying gambit, or a device to protract the war...so as to achieve other objectives."<sup>70</sup> The PLA wants to present an A2/AD threat that the United States cannot ignore. Chinese leaders want US decision makers to think that the costs to overcome the PLA are not worth the benefits. The purpose of using an A2/AD construct in war is two-fold. First, the A2/AD would disrupt and slow US military operations in a Pacific Theater conflict, which would cause a protracted, logistically complex, and deadly fight. Secondly, China hopes that the United States will be so focused on the A2/AD construct that the United States

will not be able to see China's weakness in the Indian Ocean. In order to exacerbate the concentration on the eastern border of China, China conducts territorial disputes there.

***Territorial Disputes—South China Sea:*** China is seeking to balance a more assertive stance on its disputed territorial claims with a desire to avoid generating international opposition (fig. A.4). While China has many disputed territorial claims, all of the PRC's South China Sea's disputed territories fall within the nine-dash line (fig. A.5).<sup>71</sup> China's increasingly aggressive posture in this area causes concern for many US allied countries. "China's distinctive interpretations of the law of the sea are symptomatic of its broader view that ocean management norms must come to reflect 'non-hegemonic, non-American forms of global governance' and it is pushing international law towards understandings of legitimacy grounded in Asian and Chinese values."<sup>72</sup> Put bluntly, China is using legal warfare for reflexive control in order to achieve economic gain and energy resources.

A key theme for the CCP leaders is that they will downplay its interest in the energy resources, valuable minerals in the seabed, fishing rights, and access to shipping lanes in the South China Sea. These leaders will tend to rely on a vaguely-defined "historic use" argument.

One of the PRC drivers is its ever-expanding economic and security interests. China's relations with Taiwan are continuing to improve. In 2014 the first formal contact occurred between senior officials from Taiwan and China in 65 years.<sup>73</sup> The PRC pushes new grounds of legitimacy and attempts to change international views towards Chinese values. China is doing this with a form of legal warfare called legal layering—"leveraging a set of rotating arguments, with several legal justifications in play allows for movement from one legal argument to another should the previous suffer flaws in legal validity."<sup>74</sup> For instance, China says that the nine-dash line is a historic claim; alludes to its fishing rights to show legitimate rights; and claims the area's "relevant waters."<sup>75</sup> In this example, China is using a spectrum of arguments from a maximum entitlement (historic waters) to a minimalist one (sovereignty): "either the entire area might be Chinese internal waters (best case for Beijing), or might be subject to Chinese 'sovereignty' in some form."<sup>76</sup> This type of perception-management allows Chinese leaders to

change their messaging to fit multiple audiences. The PRC is attempting to keep a gap between rhetoric and reality to create confusion.

***Response to US Technological Advances—Build a Strong Army:*** The PRC has the advantage of watching on the sidelines as the United States continues to wage war across the globe. The PRC has studied the American way of war, and while they have contempt for American arrogance,<sup>77</sup> the Chinese decision makers fear facing US conventional forces. Nevertheless, with a strong US presence in the Pacific Theater, China has no choice but to build its military. The PRC would contend that intolerable foreign policies by the United States must be controlled, and the only way to do this is with a strong military. Thus, China continues a modernization program in an attempt to be on par with the United States and ensure the security of the Chinese population.

Few states other than China have undergone such an expansive modernization and military development in the past 15 years. “The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval (PLAN) Aviation Force can field about 10 regiments of aircraft with cruise missiles to attack approaching warships—perhaps 200 aircraft.”<sup>78</sup> However, the Chinese Navy holds its submarines as the most important.<sup>79</sup> This is because submarines are inherently difficult to locate. “In the 10 years between 1995 and 2007, the PLAN commissioned 38 new submarines.”<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, estimates show that it would take approximately 60 to 75 submarines to perform a modern day anti-access tactic in the South China Sea.<sup>81</sup> Thus, one can expect China to continue to grow its naval forces until it could be confident in its ability to conventionally face the United States. The worry for China is not just facing the US military in the South China Sea but also the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean, a strategic key to China’s economic future, is a distance challenge for the PLA that will cause the CCP leaders to continue its military modernization program. While the Chinese decision makers believe it can hold the United States at risk in the Pacific, it knows that it cannot currently project conventional military power successfully outside of the nine-dash line (fig. A.5). China will continue to grow its sphere of influence in its attempt to increase its own national security.

## **Future Shocks and Trends**

***Conflicts for Water and Energy Sources:*** China's quick rise to power is an unparalleled global event.<sup>82</sup> With such a quick ascent, China's senior officials are increasingly worried about resources such as water, food, and energy to ensure it will continue to rise and are taking an active role in securing these resources. Chinese leaders pursue "resource nationalism."<sup>83</sup> China will not leave water and energy sources up to vulnerabilities in the international market because they are a vital national interest. China believes that "energy security is too important to be left to the markets, and so far its approach has been decidedly neo-mercantilist and competitive."<sup>84</sup> As "easy oil"<sup>85</sup> deposits start to become scarcer, the United States can expect China to take an aggressive stance to protect its access to oil and other energy resources. With China's continued growth, oil demands will continue to rise as well as China searches for more oil deposits. China needs to keep its sea lanes open in order to have a constant supply of energy resources to run its economy. A2/AD provides limited protection for China's sea operations. One can expect that China will also expand its navy to protect its supply routes from Africa and the Middle East. This leads to China's interest in the Indian Ocean and its littorals. The principal oil lanes, as well as commerce lanes, come through the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, and Malacca. "Forty percent of seaborne crude oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz at one end of the ocean, and 50 percent of the world's merchant fleet capacity is hosted at the Strait of Malacca, at the other end, making the Indian Ocean the globe's busiest and most important interstate."<sup>86</sup> China will not allow these vital resources to be endangered. The United States has to have strategic empathy for China's need for resources. As oil consumptions rise, so will competition for the command of the Indian Ocean and energy resources.<sup>87</sup>

***Competition with India:*** On President Xi's 2014 tour of India to meet with Narendra Modi, India's prime minister, the Communist leader discussed bringing China's direct investment from \$400-million to over \$100-billion in the next few years.<sup>88</sup> Even with a heated border dispute,<sup>89</sup> China tries to strike a balance between old frictions and economics.

China hopes to shape relations with India, the major power in the Indian Ocean, with its influx of investment capital into the state. On the other hand, most strategists are bewildered at why China would continue exacerbating a border dispute with India and at the same time attempt to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties. For instance, there were over 400 reports of Chinese PLA incursions across the Himalayan border in 2013.<sup>90</sup> These events seem contradictory—diplomatically talk about economic agreements and militarily disregard international norms. However, China is acting in accordance with the reflexive control theory. China has learned that with bold economic promises, it can introduce new norms and bulldoze existing paradigms on where China fits into the international arena. The PRC's sleeker hybrid international relations coupled with China's economic strength allows China to push its version of how the world should look.

In early 2009, the PRC funded the International Monetary Fund with \$50 billion and the Hong Kong's Asian monetary fund with \$25 billion; "extended a \$25 billion loan to cash-strapped Russian oil companies; set aside \$30 billion for Australian resource companies; offered tens of billions more to various countries or companies in South America, central and Southeast Asia, to secure resources."<sup>91</sup> China wants to use reflexive control to secure water, fuel, and resources that it will need for continued growth.

***US Cyber Vulnerabilities:*** While the United States clearly outperforms China in a number of ways, such as naval power, conventional power, and oil production, the United States still needs to realize that China will attempt to exploit US cyber operations when it suits its need. Cyber-attacks primarily seek to either gain information that it can later use to damage the state or utilize cyber weapons to cause direct damage.

One area that must be examined is that most of America's technological development comes from outside of the United States. "America's trade balance in high-tech goods and services went from a positive \$50 billion in 1996 to a negative \$50 billion in 2006, while only three out of the top ten companies granted patents for new products and inventions were

American.”<sup>92</sup> If technological innovations begin to take place outside of the United States, then the United States will be vulnerable to future foreign technology exploits.

In *Unrestricted Warfare*, it is noted that today’s high technology could quickly become tomorrow’s low technology.<sup>93</sup> As more US advanced weapons depend on cyber connectivity, the United States opens itself up for more cyber-attacks. China is able to compete with the United States in a new kind of military superiority—technological warfare superiority. China will attempt to attack the US command and control systems. The PLA will use cyber weapons and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to take out the US space infrastructure. The PRC knows that the US military relies on space and cyberspace to enable its conventional forces. The CCP will asymmetrically attack this construct using all available means. The United States has been lucky in its previous conflicts to enjoy protected bases in which it could run and supply its operations in a relatively secure environment. China has the means to disrupt this operational paradigm. Cyber weapons provide China the capability to attack the United States on its homeland. It is alleged that China has already conducted probing attacks against US networks.<sup>94</sup> With a disruption of service to the electrical system, a foreign state could have a powerful leverage tool against the United States. The United States must be prepared for an escalatory countermove using all of its instruments of power.

### **PRC Vulnerabilities**

***No Chinese Boots on the Ground:*** The reason to explore stopping China’s ability to do an amphibious assault or airdrop troops onto Taiwan is because that is a PLA weak point. A planner should look at where the enemy weak points are as well as one’s own weaknesses. If the US military were to look at a conventional fight, the air war launched from Taiwan could be over before a single plane left the ground based upon the PLA’s credible ballistic missile threat.<sup>95</sup> A key vulnerability in China’s strategy is that it will need more than just a potential use of missiles. The PLA will need to project power. China will require boots on the ground if it hopes to have a lasting effect.

While China will never reveal how it will fight to reclaim a self-declared independent Taiwan, one can assume that a part of the plan is to put ground troops on the island. The most likely way to do this is through an amphibious assault. Looking at China's slowly increasing transport vessel numbers, it is estimated that the PLAN could have around 100 vessels by 2020.<sup>96</sup> Assuming that China uses all of its ships, the PLA could transport 31,000 troops and about 600 armored fighting vehicles.<sup>97</sup> As a point of comparison, 120,000 Allied troops were used in the "D-Day" assault on French soil on June 6, 1944.<sup>98</sup> "Amphibious operations are dauntingly difficult, and for years analysts and scholars have assessed China's ability to conduct an invasion as limited, at best."<sup>99</sup> Especially when one considers that Taiwan's has 190,000 active-duty army troops and more than 1 million reservists.<sup>100</sup> There will be many challenges if China decides to place troops on the ground.<sup>101</sup> The United States can exacerbate these issues by dissecting the daunting pressures the Chinese will face.

For example, Chinese vessels will have to enter the weapons engagement zone of missiles that can be placed on Taiwan. Taiwan and the United States could defend against a Chinese assault with the use of intermediate-range ground launch ballistic missiles.<sup>102</sup> Placing sea mines could also severely slow the advancement of PLA naval vessels.<sup>103</sup> A final defeating blow would be to destroy the ships and troops with a combined land-to-sea assault using short-range ballistic weapons combined with close-air support.<sup>104</sup> With all of China's advancements, the United States could still render Chinese projection capabilities militarily ineffective. If China believes it could not meet one of its stated primary objectives, the CCP would not enter a war that it believed it could not win. The CCP cannot risk an overthrow by allowing a situation to develop where the Chinese population views it as weak.

**"Archipelagic Defense":** Dr. Andrew Krepinovich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, coined the term "Archipelagic Defense" in a March 2015 essay as a way to describe a linked defense along the first island chain.<sup>105</sup> Dr. Krepinovich's idea takes no boots on the ground a step further and says that the US Army could operate "longer-range systems capable of intercepting Chinese cruise missiles and destroying advanced Chinese



aircraft.”<sup>106</sup> The US military can stop PLA troops from an amphibious assault, and also set up an artillery force and antiship cruise missiles coastal defense along the first island chain.<sup>107</sup> Similar to the “No Chinese Boots on the Ground” concept, Dr. Krepinovich also notes that mining “key chokepoints along the first island chain would greatly complicate a Chinese naval offensive and hamper China’s ability to harass allied naval forces.”<sup>108</sup>

***Helping with Water:*** Even though Chinese government officials talk in carefully scripted, vague messaging, China’s actions show that the state is worried about the future struggle over natural resources. Water is a Chinese concern. China attempted the world’s biggest water diversion project, the South-North Water Diversion Project, to try to fix a perplexing water scarcity problem.<sup>109</sup> China faces a chronic shortage of water and while there are many reasons for this,<sup>110</sup> it could be an avenue to defeat China’s non-kinetic warfare strategy. Water will be China’s main concern because if Chinese people do not have a ready supply of water, a revolt against the CCP will be imminent. The CCP knows that it must meet the basic needs of its people or else the communist regime will begin to lose legitimacy. The United States could use a water scarcity crisis or even an engineering problem to send in military advisors to help. If China is seen as requiring help from outsiders to take care of its people, its people will start to question whether or not the system needs a radical change. America has the ability to aid China in its quest for resources, and America can use this as leverage to defeat China’s non-kinetic campaign. China knows that it can manipulate other countries with economic enticements, but America can use China’s natural resource deficiency as a leverage point in a campaign to counter their strategic messaging. Even if people decrease their water usage, the population and industrial growth will continue to increase China’s demand for water. Energy resource demands will also increase in the future. China will look towards the Indian Ocean region for these resources.

***China’s Blue Water Weakness and the Indian Ocean:*** The PRC is making a strategic rebalancing of its own in the maritime domain.<sup>111</sup> “China has come to understand just how much it relies on maritime trade for the supply of energy and raw materials and the passage of its



exports, which drives its economic growth.”<sup>112</sup> In 2004, President Hu Jintao emphasized the need to build China’s maritime power and also noted the “Malacca dilemma,” which is the fact that around 80 percent of China’s oil is transported through the Strait of Malacca (fig. A.6).<sup>113</sup> Robert Kaplan has called the Strait of Malacca the “Fulda Gap of the 21st century” because of the buildup of resources in and around the Indian Ocean.<sup>114</sup>

The Strait of Malacca is one of many concerns for the PRC in the maritime domain; the need for a constant flow of energy resources has spread China’s interests to areas such as Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, and other countries that are willing to give China port access to the Indian Ocean (fig. A.7).<sup>115</sup> The dual-use naval ports can be used for merchant ships and for wartime purposes.

In *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, Alfred Thayer Mahan says that a determining factor of a state’s power is its ability to protect its shipping business.<sup>116</sup> For China, it is more about protecting its energy supply to support its economy. While China’s naval power is catching up slowly, China’s navy is no match for the US maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean. China’s demand for energy resources from the Indian Ocean cannot be overstated. “[China] is the world’s second largest consumer of oil after the U.S.”<sup>117</sup> China’s oil requirement has doubled in the last two decades and will do so again in the next two decades.<sup>118</sup> China identified its maritime vulnerability. It has attempted to alleviate its reliance on shipping with development of seaports, like the one at Gwadar, Pakistan.<sup>119</sup> China hopes to build lines of communication to transport resources from Pakistan into China and also build an oil pipeline. Like it has done with many other countries, China has offered a huge influx of Chinese money (in this case \$45.6 billion over six years) to secure this energy deal with Pakistan.<sup>120</sup> The United States could use diplomatic ties with India and Pakistan to stymie China’s plan for oil pipelines. The US Navy could also hold Chinese assets at risk as they make their way by sea from Africa or the Middle East through the Indian Ocean travelling to any of China’s proxy seaports. America has a clear naval advantage that can block Chinese access to its economic lifeline.

### ***China's Attempt to Limit Its Maritime Vulnerability: Pipelines from Pakistan and***

***Russia:*** China has identified its maritime vulnerability years ago, and the PRC is aggressively investing in pipelines to reduce its risk. Besides the \$45.6 billion to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China has also reached a historic deal with Russia. The PRC reached a deal with Russia after more than 20 years of negotiation that will supply \$400 billion worth of Russian gas to China over the next three decades.<sup>121</sup> The Pakistan and Russian pipeline deals are a clear attempt to subvert its geographic reality and reduce China's reliance on navigating the Indian Ocean. These pipelines are just a start. China would like multiple pipelines to cut off the over 1,800 miles by sea off the present journey from China's main oil sources to its sea ports.

### **Render Chinese Strategy Irrelevant**

***Better Phase "0" Operations:*** The United States could begin to render the forms of warfare currently used by China irrelevant by concentrating on Phase "0"—shaping operations.<sup>122</sup> With a new US outlook, Chinese propaganda and informational methods of warfare would be ineffective. There are a number of different ways that the United States could implement these steps.

First, the United States needs to clearly define a strategic end state in the Pacific region and articulate this to the international community. The articulation of this message as well as the target audience needs to be viewed as a critical informational campaign. If China attempts to act in ways that are not in accordance with how the United States is shaping the contextual reality, then a congruent US informational campaign should immediately take place.

If US assets could use non-kinetic means, such as a cyber-attack, to eliminate restrictions imposed by the Central Propaganda Department to allow a free flow of information to the Chinese population, then this would decrease some of the control the CCP has on its people. If the PRC's primary concern is nationalism and control over its people, then providing a factual information counterbalance could defeat the PRC's domestic propaganda message.

Additionally, the United States should not alter military exercises because of Chinese requests to do so. China is slowly building up a routine that the American military needs to

consult with China in order to conduct any operations in the Pacific Theater.<sup>123</sup> This should not be the case. This degrades US power projection and also diminishes the perception of US strength in the Pacific. If the United States acts in favor of the Chinese every time it nudges US action in the Pacific, this could be extremely detrimental to Phase “0” operations. The United States needs to stick to the concept of freedom of navigation. China could counterbalance this move with escalatory actions. For example, China could move naval assets within striking distance to the United States. America must be prepared to deter such actions.

China has also effectively shaped relations between the United States and Taiwan on a few instances. An example of this is when, in 2009, the United States did not sell all of the items Taiwan requested and what Taiwan deemed to be a critical capability shortfall.<sup>124</sup> The United States cannot let the perception exist that PRC pressure can effect US support for Taiwan. If United States seems to weaken in its backing of Taiwan through its actions, this could send an unwanted, misconstrued message to the allies in the Asia-Pacific.<sup>125</sup>

To militarily render the A2/AD ineffective, the United States needs to withdraw from the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in order to help build missile systems that could be used to deter Chinese aggression.<sup>126</sup> Next, the United States should use allies in the region to help defray the cost of stopping Chinese boots on the ground. New diplomatic agreements may have to be made in order to do this, but a countermove to A2/AD construct such as this would render China’s options for war ineffective.

Additionally, the United States must disperse its assets instead of using fixed sites for items such as aircraft.<sup>127</sup> If the United States could increase the Chinese intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) requirements for targeting, then China’s battlefield decision-making capability could be retarded to a point of paralysis. There are other options of where to base aircraft in the Pacific also. If the United States Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) were to enter a conflict with China, there would be more risk than the forces currently train to. For example, fighters often limit themselves to 8,000 feet of runway for typical training sorties. This severely

limits the locations where fighters could be based out of. Fighters can land on shorter runways if leaders were willing to accept more risk in training.<sup>128</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The US strategists need to rethink the A2/AD construct and how America considers Chinese foreign policy. The current course can be likened to a pilot and co-pilot who fly into unexpected weather and land at the wrong airport. This type of mishap usually happens when a series of events cause confusion and task saturation for the pilots, which then leads to a myopic focus. The pilots get so absorbed by the unexpected weather difficulties that they forget to navigate. In making this mistake, the pilots miss the crucial information that was clearly available that could have prevented the embarrassment of landing at the wrong airport.

The task-saturated pilot and co-pilot scenario is similar to what is happening to America due to the reflexive control being used by the Chinese. The PRC is creating an environment of confusion and disinformation to cause the United States “to land at the wrong airport.” The US focus should not solely be on the A2/AD problem. The United States must recognize that China can be held at risk in the Indian Ocean. Additionally, China cannot put troops on US allies’ territory if proper defenses are funded. US policy makers must shape an advantageous environment.

US decision makers must step back and look at the larger picture and think about the A2/AD process as a piece of a larger strategy that China uses. In January 2015, a professor of Chinese politics said, “The traditional paradigms for interpreting Chinese foreign policy are growing increasingly obsolete.”<sup>129</sup> China uses non-kinetic means and conflicting messaging in order to keep America confused, frustrated, and task-saturated. The PRC’s assertive stance on its territorial claims will not stop in the future, especially with the potential South China Sea’s vast oil reserves that could last China for decades.<sup>130</sup>

All is not lost. While there are many differences between the United States and the PRC, there is also common ground that could be used for diplomatic negotiations. However, US decision makers must realize that the current state of affairs is extremely aggressive and

proactive steps must be taken in order to counter China's assertiveness. The United States must be willing to challenge the current assumption that it understands the A2/AD construct.

Military planners often fall into the trap trying to solve the first problem that comes to mind. Strategic empaths must continually challenge the assumptions to any plan and be courageous enough to challenge what is driving and constraining the enemy. America can resist China's reflexive control by shaping the environment better today in order to avoid a costly war tomorrow. The PRC's greatest vulnerabilities are its inability to project decisive power and the ability to protect its Indian Ocean sea lines of communication. China has less than 100 amphibious ships to project power and any serious attrition of those vessels significantly impairs the PRC's ability to achieve its objectives. This schema combined with leveraging deterrence options that place the PRC's Indian Ocean transit routes at risk provide a viable means to counter aggressive PRC behavior in the Pacific. If the United States ignores the Indian Ocean, the PRC will eventually have alternate supply routes through Pakistan and Burma and the ability to employ A2/AD to protect those routes. Now is the time to recognize that a problem exists. America must be willing to hold China at risk to deter the PRC's aggressiveness. How the tension between the United States and the PRC plays out will be heavily influenced by how America responds to China's aggression. A transformation must take place across our nation's ways and means in order to meet successful future foreign policy ends.

## Appendix A




Figure A.1. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) dispute over Senkaku Islands (Reprinted from “Territorial Disputes Hamper Exploration and Production of Resources in the East China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 5 October 2012, <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8270>).



Figure A.2. China's development of the Spratly Islands (Reprinted from “Construction in the South China Sea,” *The Economist*, 28 Feb 2015, 35).





Figure A.3. Picture of Xinhua News Agency advertising in Times Square, (Reprinted from Xinhuanet.com, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/photo/2011-08/02/131023654\\_9221n.jpg](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/photo/2011-08/02/131023654_9221n.jpg)).



Figure A.4. China's Disputed Territories. (Reprinted from The University of Texas Libraries, [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle\\_east\\_and\\_asia/china\\_disputed\\_territories\\_2009.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_disputed_territories_2009.jpg)). "While not exhaustive, three of China's major ongoing territorial disputes are based on claims along its shared border with India and Bhutan, the South China Sea, and with Japan in the East China Sea."



Figure A.5. Nine-dashed line. (Reprinted from The Economist, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/05/china-v-vietnam>).







Figure A.7. China's port system to support energy access. (Reprinted from Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2008 and included location of China's Anti-Pirate Task Force operation off the coast of Somalia <http://www.eaglespeak.us/2010/06/india-and-chinas-string-of-pearls-sea.html>).

1. Zachary Shore, *A Sense of the Enemy: The High-Stakes History of Reading Your Rival's Mind* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 201.
2. Dick Wilson, "The Great Helmsman," *The Wilson Quarterly: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, Autumn 1980, 114-115.
3. Shore, *A Sense of the Enemy*, 2.
4. The Chinese view the concept of time differently than Americans do. As Henry Kissinger says in his book *Does America Need a Foreign Policy*, "China's sense of time beats to a different rhythm from America's. When an American is asked to date a historical event, he refers to a specific day on the calendar; when a Chinese describes an event, he places it within a dynasty. And of the fourteen imperial dynasties, ten have each lasted longer than the entire history of the United States." Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 137.
5. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is the "supreme leading organ of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China. It directs and commands the national armed forces." People's Republic of China (PRC) Government, "Central Military Commission," *People's Daily Online*,

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<http://english.people.com.cn/data/organs/militarycommission.html> (accessed 23 November 2014).

6. Stefan Halper, *China: The Three Warfares* (Washington DC: Office of Net Assessment, 2013), 11.

7. “Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.” Office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011*, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 16 August 2011), 26, [http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011\\_CMPR\\_Final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf) (accessed 23 November 2014).

8. “Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests” (ibid.).

9. “Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be employed to hamstring an adversary’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. Legal warfare is also intended to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions. China has attempted to employ legal warfare in the maritime domain and in international airspace in pursuit of a security buffer zone” (ibid.).

10. Timothy A. Walton, “China’s Three Warfares,” *Delex Special Report Brief* (Herndon, VA: Delex Systems Inc., 2012), 5.

11. Ibid.

12. “China’s Spat With Japan: Out but Not Over,” *The Economist*, 24 September 2010, [http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/09/chinas\\_spat\\_japan](http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/09/chinas_spat_japan). (accessed 30 March 2015).

13. Ibid.

14. Michael Pillsbury, *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*, (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2015), Apple iBook.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. “Construction in the South China Sea: Reclamation Marks,” *The Economist*, 28 February 2015, 35.

19. Ibid., “Vietnam is estimated to have built on 25 features in the Spratlys. Taiwan is quietly building a new port big enough to host warships on Itu Aba (also known as Taiping), in natural terms the largest of the Spratlys” (ibid.).

20. Ibid.

21. Geoff A. Dyer, *The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China—and How America Can Win* (New York, NY: Random House, 2014), 91. “China is not the maker of these problems and still less the perpetrator of harm,” says Cui Tiankai, a former vice foreign minister who became ambassador to the U.S. in 2013. “Rather, China is a victim on which harm has been imposed” (ibid.).

22. Pillsbury, *The Hundred-Year Marathon*, Apple iBook. When Pillsbury was part of the US delegation to China that included Robert Ellsworth and Robert Dole in 1996, China was carefully shaping top decision makers. At the time, Robert Dole was a top Republican



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presidential nominee and Ellsworth was his top foreign policy advisor. The tour was setup so that the delegation truly believed they were getting “an unprecedented look at [China’s] inner workings and problems. The delegation believed they were getting a “forthright exchange of views with Chinese scholars.” As part of Three Warfares, there is usually a bit of truth to every disinformation campaign. The Chinese scholars spoke about “serious economic and political peril—and that the potential for collapse loomed large. These distinguished scholars pointed to China’s serious environmental problems, restless ethnic minorities, and incompetent and corrupt government leaders—as well as to those leader’s inability to carry out necessary reforms.” The CCP knew what that the delegation would believe so it was able to intertwine a bit of true information mixed with disinformation. Pillsbury was “astonished by these scholars’ candor and startled by their predictions, which only underscored [his] support for efforts to provide U.S. aid to a supposedly fragile China” (ibid.).

23. It is interesting to note that Chinese intentions can be harmful and helpful at the same time. This is the result of its undecided feelings towards the United States. The United States provides prosperity for China even though it simultaneously threatens Chinese security.

24. Xiao Qiang, “Dai Bingguo: The Core Interests of the People’s Republic of China,” *China Digital Times*, 7 August 2009, <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/08/dai-bingguo-%E6%88%B4%E7%A7%89%E5%9B%BD-the-core-interests-of-the-prc/> (accessed 23 November 2014).

25. Richard McGregor, *The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers*, (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2010), Apple iBook.

26. Walton, “China’s Three Warfares,” 11.

27. Roger Cliff et al., *Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 39.

28. Col Qiao Liang and Col Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), 36, 45, 90, 204. The mix of Eastern and Western thought could be an implicit acknowledgement of limitations of narrowly focused study. The broad use of multiple theorists shows an internalization of multiple concepts (ibid., 36-40).

29. Ibid., 115.

30. “The Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) groups six countries—China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—and aims to be the dominant security institution in its region; but its origin and purposes are largely Chinese. So it looks rather worrying from a Western point of view that the group has agreed to expand and that India, Pakistan and Iran are all keen to join: the rise of a kind of China-led NATO to which even America’s friends, such as India and Pakistan, seem drawn... In August, the SCO held its largest joint military exercises yet, an anti-terrorist drill in Inner Mongolia in China involving more than 7,000 personnel... But to note the potential conflicts among the different multilateral organizations China is promoting may be to miss the point. America’s leading role in Asia is based on a number of bilateral security treaties and a plethora of inclusive multilateral institutions, all open to Chinese membership. China itself is building all sorts of institutions: the SCO, CICA the “BRICS” (grouping China with Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa), a Trilateral Commission (at present languishing) with South Korea and Japan and a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Their shared characteristics are that China has a big and sometimes dominant role and that the United States is not a member—and indeed was rebuffed when it sought to join the SCO as an observer. China is not just challenging the existing world order. Slowly, messily and,

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apparently with no clear end in view, it is building a new one.” “Banyan: Pax Sinica,” *The Economist*, 20 September 2014, 39.

31. Steve DeWeese et al., *Capability of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation*, Report for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (McLean, VA: Northrop Grumman, 2009), 7.

32. Ibid., 7.

33. Ibid., 8.

34. Ibid., 11. *The Science of Military Strategy* is one of PLA’s most authoritative public statements on its doctrine for military operations. C4ISR and logistics systems networks are also named in *The Science of Campaigns*, which is another authoritative doctrinal book (ibid.).

35. Halper, *China*, 14.

36. Ibid., 14.

37. Thomas Heberer, “China in 2014: Creating a New Power and Security Architecture in Domestic and Foreign Policies,” *Asian Survey*, vol. 55, no. 1 (January/February 2015), 93.

38. “The acceptance of the United Nations Charter by the overwhelming majority of the members of the family of nations brings to mind the first great European or world charter, the Peace of Westphalia. To it is traditionally attributed the importance and dignity of being the first of several attempts to establish something resembling world unity on the basis of states exercising untrammelled sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated to no earthly authority.” Lee Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 42, no. 1 (January 1948): 5, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2193560>.

39. Halper, *China*, 14

40. “Economic Success Has Given China Greater Weight, but Not Nearly Enough to Tip the Balance,” *The Economist*, 23 November 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21590099-economic-success-has-given-china-greater-weight-not-nearly-enough-tip> (accessed 30 March 2015). With China’s economic success, comes an expected appetite for more power. China has blocking power in the UN when it stands with Russia, such as removing the Syrian regime or imposing new sanctions on Iran (ibid.).

41. Halper, *China*, 14.

42. Ibid., 15.

43. Ibid., 15.

44. Heberer, “China in 2014,” 94.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Dr. Michael Kraig, “Managed Competition in the 21st Century Asia Pacific: Identity, Sovereign Autonomy, and Globalized Wealth” (NS AY15 Course Reading, Maxwell AFB, AL), 22.

49. Ibid.

50. Halper, *China*, 457.

51. Heberer, “China in 2014,” 92.

52. The Communist leaders were so worried that the wrong person could get elected in Hong Kong, that candidates had to be pre-selected by the National People’s Congress (Heberer, “China in 2014,” 91).

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53. Dr. Robert C. DiPrizio, "Great Power Politics: A Brief Survey of US Relations with China, the EU, Russia, India, and Japan" (NS AY15 Course Reading, Maxwell AFB, AL), 6.
54. NS, ACSC.
55. Halper, *China*, 359.
56. Halper, *China*, 359.
57. Propaganda has a negative connotation in Western culture. However, propaganda is seen as necessary in the communist society. China has an official propaganda department called the Central Propaganda Department, which is "one of only two Party organizations from the earliest years of the CCP to have survived into the twenty-first century." The Central Propaganda Department controls all of the Chinese media. "Central Propaganda Department," Encyclopedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture, [http://contemporary\\_chinese\\_culture.academic.ru/91/Central\\_Propaganda\\_Department](http://contemporary_chinese_culture.academic.ru/91/Central_Propaganda_Department).
58. Stuart Elliot, "Sign of Arrival, for Xinhua, Is 60 Feet Tall," *New York Times*, 25 July 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/business/media/xinhuas-giant-sign-to-blink-on-in-times-square.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/business/media/xinhuas-giant-sign-to-blink-on-in-times-square.html?_r=0).
59. Dyer, *The Contest of the Century*, 175.
60. Approximate translation is China News Corporation.
61. Dyer, *The Contest of the Century*, Apple iBook.
62. Ibid. Joseph Nye, a Harvard University professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense, originally coined the term soft power. "America's international dominance, so the theory goes, rests not just on its military power or its economic weight but also on the fact that so many other countries around the world have sought to copy its rules, institutions, and way of life. Nye defined soft power as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment' (ibid)."
63. Joseph Nye, "The Decline of America's Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/59888>.
64. Dyer, *The Contest of the Century*, Apple iBook.
65. Nye, "The Decline of America's Soft Power".
66. Dyer, *The Contest of the Century*, Apple iBook.
67. Ibid., Apple iBook.
68. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77. Sun Tzu says that the best strategy is "to attack the enemy's strategy" and "subdue the enemy's army without fighting is the acme of skill" (ibid.).
69. John B. Hattendorf, "The Idea of a 'Fleet in Being' In Historical Perspective," *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 43-61, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA591446>.
70. Ibid., 56. The Royal Navy used the fleet in being in both 1690 and the War of the American Revolution. The protracted wars caused severe political repercussions (ibid.).
71. SECDEF, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011*, 25. "Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, the Republic of China began publishing regional maps with a dashed line around the perimeter of South China Sea. After taking power in 1949, the CCP maintained this claim." The PRC keeps the legal definitions over this "U-shaped" line vague. China keeps vague language to avoid triggering a possible embarrassing media message that they control something but someone else's military is there (i.e., Taiwan) (ibid.).
72. Halper. *China*, 52.

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73. "The Economist Explains Why China and Taiwan are Divided," *The Economist*, 25 August 2014, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/08/economist-explains-16> (accessed 28 November 2014).
- 74 Ibid., 53.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Ibid, 440.
77. Liang, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 5, 90.
78. Phillip C. Saunders et al. ed., *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), 206.
79. Ibid., 207.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 207-208.
82. Ibid., 12.
83. Michael T. Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books: 2008), 23. "Resource nationalism" refers to "the management of energy flows in accordance with state interests...[and] applies to efforts by leaders of the deficit states to protect their national interests in a world of intense competition over the available pool of supply" (ibid.)
84. Ibid., 24.
85. Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet*, 34-35, 40. When energy resources are first found such as oil, developers go after the easy to extract sources that can be exploited easily. "Typically, most of the 'easy' deposits are exhausted by the time a resource approaches its peak moment, as now appears to be the case for oil, and soon will be so for natural gas, coal, uranium, and a number of other vital substances." An "easy" source of oil would be the oil from Saudi Arabia when compared to the Canadian tar sands, which takes a lot of energy to convert oil shale into synthetic fuel (ibid.).
86. Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*, (Random House. 2011), 7.
87. Ibid., 7. "The Indian Ocean rimland from the Middle East to the Pacific accounts for 70 percent of the traffic of petroleum products for the entire world. The world's energy needs will by 50 percent by 2030" (ibid.).
88. Ibid.
89. Jeff Smith, "Crossing the Line at Odd Times: China-India Border Disputes," *Foreign Policy*, 16 October 2014, [http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/16/crossing\\_the\\_line\\_at\\_odd\\_times\\_china\\_india\\_border\\_disputes](http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/10/16/crossing_the_line_at_odd_times_china_india_border_disputes) (accessed 28 November 2014). "Last month yet another standoff at the disputed China-India border reached yet another peaceful conclusion, though not before spoiling the atmosphere of Chinese President Xi Jinping's inaugural visit to India. In mid-September, as many as 1,000 Chinese soldiers crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, Kashmir and were met in a prolonged face-off by an equal number of Indian troops. While violations of the de facto border are a common affair, the conspicuous timing and motives of the latest intrusion, and its broader implications for Sino-Indian relations, merit greater scrutiny" (ibid.).
90. Ibid.
91. McGregor, *The Party*, 10-11.
92. P.W. Singer, *Wired For War*, (New York, NY: Penguin Book), 2010, 249.

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93. Liang, *Unrestricted Warfare*, 17.
94. "Chinese Cyber-attacks: Hello, Unit 61398," *The Economist*, 19 February 2013, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/02/chinese-cyber-attacks> (accessed 30 March 2015) and Mandiant, "Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units," [www.intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant\\_APT1\\_Report.pdf](http://www.intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf). Mandiant alleges that it can trace hundreds of attacks originating from China. China denies the claims (ibid.).
95. David A. Shlapak et al., *A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 85, 89-90. A prudent planner would have to assume that China would employ a strategy that would have the least risk to its force and highest probability of success. China has hundreds of missiles that are capable of ranging Taiwan air bases and would most likely use them to stop aircraft from even launching. Currently the infrastructure is not in place to defend against such an attack such as using a super-shelter capable of withstanding hundreds of ballistic missiles. RAND is not "aware of [any] plan in Washington or Taipei to spend the billions of US dollars it would take to construct the kinds and numbers of aircraft shelters featured in [a] 'high-shelter' and 'super-shelter' cases; and no combination of existing or near-term short-range defenses seems likely" to help this cause (ibid., 89-90).
96. Ibid., 104.
97. Ibid. This number assumes that China retires older ships as new ones enter the fleet; "the PLAN could speed up the growth of its transport capacity simply by keeping the older vessels in service longer. Also, [landing ships] are among the least-complex warships to build, so China could accelerate production if it so chose" (ibid.).
98. Ibid.
99. Shlapak, *A Question of Balance*, 18.
100. Ibid., 105.
101. Ibid., 18. "The Falklands campaign of 1982 is illustrative of many of the challenges that will confront any amphibious attacker in the era of the antiship missile. Nearly half of the surface combatants committed to the South Atlantic by Great Britain were damaged, and 15 percent were sunk by an enemy possessing a literal handful of modern antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The British task force also lost 29 percent of its Harrier fighters, while the Argentine air force and naval air arm lost 45 percent of the combat aircraft they sent into action" (ibid., 19).
102. Diplomatically, the United States could withdraw from its intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty that bans nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. The United States can increase its military capability by not restricting itself with treaties that the Chinese do not have to follow.
103. Shlapak, *A Question of Balance*, 18.
104. Ibid., 18.
105. Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. "How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2015. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143031/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/how-to-deter-china>.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. "A Canal Too Far: The World's Biggest Water-diversion Project Will Do Little To Alleviate Water Scarcity," *The Economist*, 27 September 2014.



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<http://www.economist.com/news/china/21620226-worlds-biggest-water-diversion-project-will-do-little-alleviate-water-scarcity-canal-too> (accessed 28 November 2014). “The new waterway is part of the biggest water-diversion scheme in the world: the second arm of what is known as the South-North Water Diversion Project. This is designed to solve an age-old imbalance. The north of China has only a fifth of the country’s naturally available fresh water but two-thirds of the farmland. The problem has grown in recent decades because of rapid urban growth and heavy pollution of scarce water supplies” (ibid.)

110. Ibid., “By increasing supply, the government is failing to confront the real source of the problem: high demand for water and inefficient use of it. Chinese industry uses ten times more water per unit of production than the average in industrialized countries, according to a report by the World Bank in 2009. A big reason for this is that water in China is far too cheap. In May 2014 Beijing introduced a new system that makes tap water more expensive the more people use. But prices are still far from market levels. Officials turn a blind eye to widespread extraction of un-tariffed groundwater by city dwellers and farmers, despite plummeting groundwater levels” (ibid.)

111. Christian Le Miere, “China’s Unarmed Arms Race”, *Foreign Affairs*, 29 July 2013, 1, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/136790>. This is a natural progress for a rising hegemon “as it moves from seeing itself as a land power primarily concerned with internal convulsions to seeing itself as a maritime power preoccupied with its maritime boundaries. The United States, for instance, turned to the sea only after it had completed its westward expansion, settled its southern boundary following the Mexican-American War, and finalized the purchase of Alaska. Similarly, as Beijing has become more confident in its ability to secure China’s interior and its land borders (many of which were previously disputed but are now resolved), it has shifted its attention to its vulnerabilities in nearby waters” (ibid.).

112. Ibid., 2.

113. Ibid. Since the early 2000’s there has been lines of effort to support China’s strategic shift to the sea. “In 2012, Beijing established its first body tasked specifically with formulating maritime policy for the Politburo” (ibid.). In April 2013, “China’s government released a white paper declaring for the first time that the People’s Liberation Army should eventually assume responsibility for “safeguarding maritime rights and interests” and “protecting overseas interests,” further indicating the country’s strategic shift to the sea” (ibid., 3).

114. Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 261. The Fulda Gap is a valley in West Germany. During the Cold War, it was assumed that Soviet tanks would transit this valley if an attack took place.

115. Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 282-283. “Despite its increasing emphasis on coal, biomass, nuclear power, and other alternatives, China requires ever more oil and natural gas, and is the world’s second largest consumer of oil after the U.S. Concurrently, Chinese officials see this very need for imported petroleum products as a pressure point that a future adversary might exploit. (The need to diversify its energy sources helps explain why China deals openly with ... Sudan) (ibid., 282).

116. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, 12th ed. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1918), iii-vi. “Foreign necessities or luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or in foreign ships, which will return, bearing in exchange the products of the country, whether they be the fruits of the earth or the works of men’s hands; and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business should be done by its own vessels. The ships that thus

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sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage” (ibid., 26).

117. Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 282.

118. Ibid.

119. Syed Fazl-e-Haider, “A Strategic Seaport: Is Pakistan Key to China’s Energy Supremacy?” *Foreign Affairs*, 5 March 2015. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143227/syed-fazl-e-haide> (accessed 23 March 2015).

120. Ibid.

121. Heberer, “China in 2014,” 100. “The Chinese will get the gas at a much lower price than the Europeans, thereby underpinning Putin’s plans to replace gas imports to Europe by those to China” (ibid.).

122. Scott D. McDonald, Brock Jones, and Jason M. Frazee, “Phase Zero: How China Exploits It, Why the United States Does Not,” *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 124. “While the United States remains focused on preparing the environment and building partners, Chinese strategic culture states a preference for defeating an adversary before what Western thought thinks of as war has begun. This outlook ultimately places the PRC in a position of strategic advantage” (ibid.).

123. Ibid., 4. “Such has been the case when Beijing protests U.S. and South Korean combined naval exercises in waters west of the Korean Peninsula. On more than one occasion the United States has acceded to PRC demands by either not deploying a carrier strike group or moving an exercise to the East Sea, off Korea’s east coast.”

124. Ibid., 4.

125. Ibid., 4-5. “While Washington publicly maintains a policy of not consulting the Chinese on arms sales to Taiwan, it is difficult to view persistent delays in selling articles of a defensive nature as anything other than attempts to dodge [China’s] ire.”

126. Mr. Harry Foster (Spaatz Center, Maxwell AFB, AL), in discussion with author, 29 August 2014 and 1 September 2014.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid. Leaders need to begin to question why 8,000 feet of runway is the desired runway length for training, when it is possible to conduct operations on shorter runways. If fighters trained regularly to shorter runways, then a reduction in runway length could open up more locations to base, or build new runways.

129. Heberer, “China in 2014,” 101.

130. US Energy Information Administration, *South China Sea*, 7 February 2013, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS>). The US Energy Information Administration estimates that “the South China Sea contains approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves.” While that sounds like a lot of oil, that figure does not include undiscovered resources which could add up to 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (ibid.).

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